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Chapter I Introduction 
 
 
1. Setting the Scene 
Corruption causes substantial damage to societies. It not only impairs the efficient 
functioning of the organs of the state and diminishes public trust in their integrity, thus 
undermining the rule of law and democracy, but it also distorts economic competition 
and undermines the foundation of economic development.1 Corruption grows in the 
shadows, mostly to the benefit of the powerful.2  It also provides a lever by which 
organised crime can gain influence in public decision-making. 
‘Corruption is bad not because money and benefits change hands, and 
not because of the motives of participants, but because it privatizes 
valuable aspects of public life, bypassing processes of representation, 
debate, and choice.’ 3 
The end of the Cold War also brought an end to the often unconditional support by 
western countries for corrupt regimes in the developing world. Instead of ideological 
loyalty, western governments increasingly demanded good governance, knowing that 
corruption is not only a major cause for poverty, but also a danger to their own 
economies, which were more and more characterised by a globalisation of trade and 
of international mergers, and thus especially vulnerable to the corruption virus.4   
Since the 1990s, the growing awareness among the states of the damage done by 
corruption has led many countries across the globe to initiating countermeasures, 
specifically in the area of criminal law.5 The increased interest in the phenomenon of 
                                                            
1 See the Preambles of the United Nations Convention against Corruption and the Council of Europe Criminal 
Law Convention on Corruption. 
2 Kubiciel (2009: 139). 
3 Thompson (1993: 369). 
4 Sanyal (2005: 139). 
5 Bannenberg & Schaupensteiner (2004: 28). 
 
 
 
 
6 
corruption has produced a multitude of policy prescriptions and reform initiatives6 of 
which the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) is the most recent 
example. In the course of this development, the gradual understanding of the nature 
and impact of the problem reflects in the progression of the counter-measures from 
targeted legal instruments directed at specific crimes such as bribery, to an 
increasingly general definition of corruption and broader measures against it.  
Since it is clear that the fight against corruption is no longer just a moral issue, but 
has become a problem of economic and political significance in countries all over the 
world, effective action is demanded. There are numerous measures which can be 
employed to rein in corruption. First on the list should be preventive measures. 
Secondly, effective criminalisation through adequate legislation is necessary to 
manifest the determination of the state and to deter potential offenders. 
UNCAC prescribes that States Parties shall criminalise, or – in some cases – at least 
consider criminalising, a wide range of acts of corruption. In doing so, UNCAC goes 
further than previous instruments of this kind, as it considers not only the most 
obvious forms of corruption, such as bribery and the embezzlement of public funds, 
but also, for example, trading in influence.7 This offence basically deals with a person 
who has good connections to public officials and wants to benefit from this fact by 
selling his ability to exert influence. More precisely, it presupposes that a private 
person gives an undue advantage to another person - the 'influence peddler', who 
himself may be a public official or a private individual - who claims, by virtue of his 
professional position or social status, to be able to exert an improper influence over 
the decision-making of a public authority.  
                                                            
6 UNODC (2004: 26). 
7 UNODC (2004: 27). 
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2. Background to the Research 
There is an immense academic discussion on the question of what corruption 
actually is.8 This is a time-consuming debate at the end of which the preference for 
one or another approach is spelled out. A general definition of the term is avoided by 
international agreements, as well as by many scholars, as it would restrict the scope 
of the contribution whilst not providing a significant benefit to the reader. 
Furthermore, corruption is characterised differently in different regions.9 Corruption is 
perceived archetypally by most observers. As United States Supreme Court Justice 
Potter Stewart argued in 1964: ‘I can´t define pornography, but I know it when I see 
it.’10  
In brief, corruption is the misuse of public power for private gain.11 Corruption usually 
entails an exchange of favours between two actors, the client and the agent.12 The 
latter is entrusted with power by his superior, the principal. By establishing certain 
rules, the principal declares how the agent has to behave with respect to the client. In 
corruption cases, the agent is acting in contravention of these rules. Corruption 
offences are characterised generally by this triangular relationship.13  
Bribery is probably the most common form of corruption and may be best 
demonstrated by the following example: A, director of a regional bank, is very 
interested in a valuable piece of real estate which is owned by the city. One of the 
biggest competitors of the bank is also interested in this property. A agrees with C, 
who is the responsible officer in the city’s construction department, that C will be 
                                                            
8 See, for example: Carr (2007: 132); Tanzi (1998: 564). 
9 UNODC (2004: 10). 
10 U.S. Supreme Court, Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964)  
11 This is the definition used by Transparency International, see on the internet: 
http://www.transparency.org/news_room/faq/corruption_faq  
12 Argandona (2007: 481). 
13 Lambsdorff (2007: 19). 
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given the opportunity to buy a luxurious mansion considerably below the market price 
if C provides A with the required construction permit for the plot. C (the agent) 
subsequently acts as desired by A (the client), thus disregarding the procedures and 
rules set up by the administration of the city (the principal) which would normally have 
applied in the case. By soliciting or accepting an undue advantage for himself (in 
form of the luxurious mansion below market price) in exchange for a favour given to 
A in the course of his official duties, C fulfils the elements of the offence of passive 
bribery under the definitions of most international anti-corruption instruments and the 
domestic laws of most countries. A, as the active briber, is also punishable.  
The question of trading in influence arises if one changes some elements in the 
previous example: The case remains the same, except that A, this time, does not 
approach C directly with his concern. A seeks out his friend and tennis partner, B, a 
city officer for waste management. A tells B about his desire and asks him for ‘help’ in 
this regard. In exchange, A offers B the opportunity to buy a luxurious mansion 
considerably below the market price. B knows C well because they had met in 
several meetings at work which concerned both of their areas of responsibility. 
Furthermore, B and C are members of the same political party. B uses his personal 
relation with C in order to obtain a construction permit for A (without C knowing of the 
agreement between A and B). In the end, C provides A with the required permit. 
The result is the same in both cases: A obtains a favourable decision from the 
responsible public officer, C. But while in the first case C receives a benefit for acting 
according to A’s wishes, he does not receive anything in the second case, but merely 
acts in order to do his friend, B, a favour. The person obtaining a benefit in exchange 
for the desired decision of the public authority is B. This second example is a clear 
case of trading in influence, where B uses his influence (arising from his position) to 
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obtain an action or decision from a public authority. Accordingly, in contrast to 
bribery, the offence of trading in influence requires a relationship which is enlarged by 
a fourth person: the ‘influence peddler’, that is, the person who commercialises his 
real or supposed influence (in our case B). The agent (C) does not appear on the 
scene himself, but remains in the background. Trading in influence thus appears as 
an indirect form of corruption, also called second-hand corruption.14 Despite its 
indirect nature, trading in influence seems neither less dangerous for a society, nor 
ethically more justifiable than the traditional offence of bribery. 
3. Objectives of the Research 
Despite being mentioned in most international anti-corruption instruments, trading in 
influence appears only rarely in the spotlight of legal practice and literature. This 
paper aims to shed some light on the issue. The main objective is to highlight the 
different forms of trading in influence stipulated in various international agreements 
and national laws in order to draw a comprehensive picture of this offence. 
Furthermore, by identifying and critically appraising the core issues connected with 
trading in influence, this paper aims to provide recommendations which may be of 
use to states obliged to implement or to consider implementing this offence. 
4. Significance and Scope of the Research 
The subject was dealt with only very briefly in the course of the academic discussion 
of the international agreements on corruption. Also, there is a dearth of books and 
papers which deal exclusively with trading in influence and its criminalisation in the 
international context.  
                                                            
14 Vander Beken, De Ruyver & Siron (2001: 17). 
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This paper will analyse critically the main sources, namely UNCAC, the African Union 
Convention on Prevention and Combating Corruption (AU Convention), the Southern 
African Development Community Protocol against Corruption (SADC Protocol) and 
the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (CoE Convention). 
Furthermore, the paper will examine the corresponding explanatory notes and try to 
provide a picture of the most important aspects of the issue. As many countries are 
obliged to consider the criminalisation of trading in influence, drawing an overview of 
it may make a substantial contribution to its comprehension.  
Due to the limited space, the paper is unable to cover all provisions of trading in 
influence in countries where it exists. Accordingly, the discussion will be restricted to 
the situation in France, Spain and Belgium. By analysing the position in these 
countries, the different approaches to criminalisation can be highlighted.  
5. Chapter Overview 
This paper consists of four further chapters. In the second chapter, the individual 
articles in the international agreements will be examined and compared. The paper 
will focus on the only truly global instrument, UNCAC, and the three other 
international agreements mentioned above. Apart from article 18 of UNCAC, trading 
in influence is mentioned in article 12 of the CoE Convention. Neither UNCAC nor the 
CoE Convention oblige States Parties legally to establish trading in influence as an 
offence. But States Parties are required to consider the establishment of the offence 
under their domestic law. Thus, apart from an analysis of the model provisions, which 
are being proposed in the conventions, the paper will try to identify the factors that 
prevented the provision from being made obligatory for the member states.  
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Under article 4(1)(f) of the AU Convention and article 3(1)(f) of the SADC Protocol, 
trading in influence is an act of corruption which should be established as an offence 
under domestic law. The said provisions are nearly identical. It is noteworthy that the 
prohibition applies to persons performing functions in both the public and the private 
sectors.  
Chapter three outlines the legislation of three European countries, namely, France, 
Belgium and Spain, which have criminalised trading in influence. This analysis will 
show that the structure and wording of the respective provisions, as well as the 
offending actions and potential perpetrators, differ substantially among these 
countries.  
Chapter four is dedicated to the search for a brief answer to the question of how one 
should differentiate between proper influence, which may be traded freely, and 
illegitimate forms of lobbying. The influence must be objectionable in common terms 
(‘improper influence’), as accepted forms of lobbyism should not be criminalised.15 
The notion of improper influence is central therefore to the determination of which 
behaviour is an offence and which is not.16  
Chapter five consists of a review of the presentation, conclusions drawn from the 
study, and recommendations for an effective implementation of the offence. 
 
 
 
                                                            
15 Explanatory Report on the CoE Convention, paragraph 65. 
16 Androulakis (2007: 328). 
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Chapter II Trading in Influence in International Agreements 
This chapter aims to provide an overview of the four international instruments dealing 
with trading in influence, to pinpoint the elements of the offence in each 
criminalisation provision and to highlight the differences between the various 
provisions. The different instruments are examined in the order of their importance, 
which manifests in their number of member states. Accordingly, the analysis starts 
with UNCAC, followed by the CoE Convention, the AU Convention and the SADC 
Protocol. 
1. United Nations Convention against Corruption 
On 31 October 2003, the UN General Assembly passed resolution 58/4, adopting 
UNCAC. Requiring 30 ratifications to become binding in accordance with article 68 
(1), UNCAC came into force on 14 December 2005.17 UNCAC is the first legally 
binding and the most comprehensive of the global instruments to prevent and combat 
corruption.18 By August 2009, UNCAC had 136 States Parties and 140 signatories.19 
The purpose of the Convention is to prevent and criminalise corrupt practices and 
promote and facilitate international cooperation and technical assistance in this 
regard.20 The Convention aims to take into account the various forms of corruption 
and to harmonise national laws by establishing a common language and common 
guidelines. Apart from the preventive measures, the criminalisation of corrupt 
practices set out in Chapter III constitutes a fundamental pillar of UNCAC. 
                                                            
17 Argandona (2007: 485). 
18 Webb (2005: 195). 
19 Updated information of the signature and ratification status is available on the Internet 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html  
20 See article 1 of UNCAC. 
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(1) The elements of the offence under article 18 of UNCAC 
Article 18 of UNCAC reads as follows:  
Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures 
as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed 
intentionally: 
(a) The promise, offering or giving to a public official or any other person, 
directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage in order that the public official or 
the person abuse his or her real or supposed influence with a view to 
obtaining from an administration or public authority of the State Party an 
undue advantage for the original instigator of the act or for any other person; 
(b) The solicitation or acceptance by a public official or any other person, 
directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage for himself or herself or for 
another person in order that the public official or the person abuse his or her 
real or supposed influence with a view to obtaining from an administration or 
public authority of the State Party an undue advantage. 
Active corruption (Art. 18(a) of UNCAC) falls within the scope of UNCAC as does 
passive corruption (Art. 18(b) of UNCAC) committed by someone who asserts or 
confirms that he is able to exert improper influence over the decision-making of a 
person who performs a function in the public sector. The aim of the provision is to 
prevent people, who are not necessarily public officials themselves, but – due to their 
work or social contacts – have good ties to public officials, from commercialising their 
influence.21 Article 18 of UNCAC mirrors the provisions concerning active and 
passive bribery of national officials stipulated by article 15, with the difference that, 
while the latter focuses on the act or omission of the public official, article 18 seeks to 
criminalise the use of a person’s influence to obtain an undue advantage for a third 
person from a public official.  
                                                            
21 van Aaken (2005: 412). 
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As otherwise the elements of the offence under article 18 of UNCAC are the same as 
those under article 15 of UNCAC, the definitions of the elements describing the 
scope of article 15 of UNCAC can be transferred to article 18 of UNCAC.22 Indeed, in 
some UN documents, the similarity of trading in influence offences with bribery 
offences is emphasised by the naming of article 18 (as far as public officials are the 
influence peddlers) as ‘active or passive bribery of public officials in relation to abuse 
of influence’.23 
(a) Possible Offenders 
Under article 18 of UNCAC, the perpetrator of the passive form of trading in influence 
may be a public official as well as a private person. According to article 2(a) of 
UNCAC a public official is any person holding a legislative, executive, administrative 
or judicial office, whether appointed or elected, or any other person who performs a 
public function or provides a public service. The UNCAC definition aims to include all 
possible categories of public officials. This definition is broader than the definition of 
other anti-corruption conventions and goes beyond the definition of many national 
criminal codes.24 Apart from ‘officials by status’, any person who provides a public 
service is considered to be a public official, regardless of his or her status. This 
definition takes account of the fact that it is generally not the status but the function 
that renders its bearer vulnerable to corruption.  
 
 
                                                            
22 UNODC (2006: 101). 
23 UNODC (2004: 36). 
24 Kubiciel (2009: 143). 
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(b) ‘Undue advantage’ 
With the term ‘undue advantage’, UNCAC covers a broad scope of incentives 
promised or offered to public officials or any other persons. An ‘advantage’ can be 
anything that places the public official or other person in a better position than he was 
before the commission of the offence. The range of ‘advantages’ is wide: mostly, it is 
something tangible and of value, such as money, precious objects and holidays. But 
also intangible advantages such as inside information, sexual or other favours, 
entertainment and employment are covered by this term.25 
The term ‘undue’ remains formless and indefinite. In regard to public officials, every 
advantage received is presumed to be undue unless the acceptance is expressly 
allowed by internal regulations. Advantages of very low value or traditionally 
accepted gifts are not regulated. While one could argue that every such advantage is 
unjustified, it is arguable also that goods of very low value ought to be beyond 
criminalisation. Where exactly the line needs to be drawn will have to be decided on 
a national basis.  
How the undue advantage is handed over does not matter. It may be promised, 
offered or given, directly or indirectly. The persons involved in the offence cannot 
avoid the contravention by using an intermediary.26 
Furthermore, the words ‘for any other persons’ indicate that the advantage may be 
given to a family member or a friend of the passive influence peddler, indirectly or 
directly, with the knowledge of the influence peddler. In contrast to articles 15 to 17 of 
UNCAC (which deal with bribery and embezzlement), it seems that the advantage 
                                                            
25 UNODC (2006: 101). 
26 UNODC (2006: 102). 
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can be received only by persons, not by entities.27 The reason for this differentiation 
remains unclear. The authors of the UNCAC Legislative Guide are nevertheless of 
the view that the advantage can be given also to a political party or another entity.28 
Additionally, the undue advantage must be linked to the trading of influence.  
(c) Offering, promising or giving 
The elements of active trading in influence are those of promising, offering or giving 
something to the influence peddler. Unlike ‘offering’, which does not require an 
agreement, promising may well imply an agreement between the peddler and the 
instigator.29 The term ‘giving’ is unproblematic. 
(d) Solicitation or acceptance 
Solicitation is a unilateral act by the influence peddler to let the prospective client 
know that an advantage is required by the influence peddler to ‘help’ him. For 
‘acceptance’ to occur, a consensus between the parties is necessary. The elements 
of the offence are fulfilled even if the influence peddler withdraws his or her 
agreement later. 
 
 
                                                            
27 During the drafting UNCAC, one delegation suggested the insertion of the words ‘or entity’ after the words 
‘any other person’. See Revised draft United Nations Convention against Corruption, Doc. A/AC.261/3/Rev.1, p. 
29, footnote 163. 
28 UNODC (2006: 102). 
29 UNODC (2006: 101). In contrast, Kubiciel (2009:146) is of the view that an express agreement is not 
necessary: ‘States and their law enforcement bodies may bear in mind that said corrupt manoeuvres can be 
either unilateral or bilateral, so that offering, promising or giving is to be penalized irrespective of the existence 
of an agreement between briber and bribe.’  
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(e) ‘in order that the public official or the person abuse his or her real or 
supposed influence’ 
The ambition of the instigator is to induce the influence peddler to abuse his or her 
real or supposed influence. The wording of article 18 does not stipulate whether or 
not the influence must be exerted or whether or not the supposed influence must 
lead to the intended result.30 But as even the pretence of influence is sufficient for the 
offence, it seems logical that the influence need not really be exerted and does not in 
fact have to lead to the intended result.  
Furthermore, with respect to a public official trading with his or her influence, article 
18 does not comment on how the influence should be connected to the public 
official’s status or duties. It remains unclear whether the ability to exert influence has 
to be facilitated through his position or be somehow related to his work or if any 
capacity on his part to manipulate another authority may be sufficient.  
The aim of the offence is to prevent not only public officials, but also private 
individuals who have good connections to (high-ranking) public authorities, from 
gaining any advantage by commercialising their ability to influence the public 
decision-making process. Thus, the influence trader has to ‘abuse’ his capacity to 
manipulate public decisions. From this it follows that, especially regarding influence 
trading between private individuals, there can be legitimate forms which might not be 
criminalised. The abuse of influence presupposes the intention to corrupt a public 
authority. 
                                                            
30 In the Revised draft United Nations Convention against Corruption, there was a formulation stating ‘whether 
or not the influence is exerted or whether or not the supposed influence leads to the intended result` in the 
then article 22; see: Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a Convention against Corruption, Doc. 
A/AC.261/3/Rev.4, 22. There are no further data as to why this phrase was deleted and not adopted in the final 
version of UNCAC. 
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(f) Mens Rea 
With regard to the subjective element, article 18 prescribes intention. The knowledge, 
intent or purpose element required for the offences under the Convention can be 
established through inference from objective factual circumstances.31  
The offender must have linked mentally the giving or receiving of an advantage with 
the incentive to exert influence illegitimately. Since the offence of trading in influence 
is committed regardless of whether or not the desired conduct of the influence 
peddler actually took place, the mens rea is fulfilled already if the bribe-giver wanted 
to induce the bribe-receiver to perform certain conduct.  
(2) The non-mandatory character of article 18 of UNCAC 
As mentioned above, the criminalisation of trading in influence is not imposed by the 
Convention. According to the wording of article 18 (‘shall consider’), States Parties 
are required to consider the implementation of such an offence into their domestic 
legislation. The lack of an obligation to criminalise certain acts, such as trading in 
influence, illicit enrichment, abuse of public functions and a number of other form of 
conduct, was criticised by scholars.32 In their view, this lack would impede the goal of 
the Convention to establish common standards for national legal systems.  
While drafting UNCAC, the Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a Convention 
against Corruption anticipated in the draft of the first session that the offence would 
be mandatory.  
                                                            
31 See article 28 of UNCAC. 
32 Argandona (2007: 490). 
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The proposals submitted by France,33 Mexico,34 Colombia,35 Turkey36 and the 
Philippines37 supported the mandatory implementation the offence (‘each State Party 
shall adopt…’). During the first reading, many delegations expressed preference for 
the French proposal as the basis for further work. Other delegations had serious 
doubts about the inclusion of this article.38 Still other delegations were of the view that 
such a provision should not be included at all. Unfortunately, the reasons raised 
against the inclusion are not stipulated in the UN documents preparing UNCAC. An 
informal working group established after the second reading of the draft text 
presented an article on the basis of the French proposal in which the hesitation on 
this issue is visible.39 Finally, at the sixth session, a non-binding version was adopted 
which was submitted by Canada, France and Italy, who also co-ordinated another 
informal working group established at the fifth session of the Ad Hoc Committee.40 
During this session, a number of delegations had suggested the deletion of this 
article; others were of the view that a mandatory formulation would be preferable. At 
the end, the majority of delegations prevailed, which considered that a non 
mandatory formulation would be necessary in order to achieve consensus. The 
decision not to introduce a mandatory provision was taken ‘especially in view of the 
significantly broad scope of the article’.41 Probably, the fact that the criminal codes of 
many countries (for example the United States and Germany) do not have a 
provision of this kind, played an important role as well. 
                                                            
33 A/AC.261/IPM/10. 
34 A/AC.261/IPM/13 
35 A/AC.261/IPM/14 
36 A/AC.261/IPM/22 
37 A/AC.261/IPM/24. 
38 Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a Convention against Corruption, Doc. A/AC.261/3/Rev.1, 29, 
footnote 162. 
39 See article 18 ‘Each State Party shall [adopt] [consider adopting] such legislative…’ in: Ad Hoc Committee for 
the Negotiation of a Convention against Corruption, Doc. A/AC.261/3/Rev.3. 
40 Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a Convention against Corruption, Doc. A/AC.261/3/Rev.4, 22.  
41 Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a Convention against Corruption, Doc. A/AC.261/3/Rev.4; 22. Fn. 
103. 
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2. Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption 
The Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (CoE Convention) 
was adopted in November 1998 by the Council of Ministers and opened for signature 
in January 1999. The Convention entered into force in July 2002 when the prescribed 
number of 14 ratifications was achieved. The Convention is open for signature by the 
member States of the Council of Europe and six non-member states42 which have 
participated in its elaboration. Also, other states and the EU can be invited to join the 
Convention. By the end of August 2009, the CoE Convention had been signed by 49 
states, 41 of which have ratified it thus far.  
The Council of Europe chose a multidisciplinary approach to the fight against 
corruption. The main pillars are the standardisation of European norms concerning 
corruption offences, the monitoring of compliance with these norms and capacity 
building through technical co-operation programmes. The monitoring of compliance 
with the Convention is being carried out by the Group of States against Corruption 
(GRECO), which started work in May 1999.43  
The Convention does not provide a uniform definition of corruption, but presents a 
commonly agreed definition of bribery which serves as the basis for various forms of 
criminalisation. The Convention covers a broad range of offences, including private 
sector corruption and money laundering. In contrast to the anti-corruption instruments 
of the European Union,44 article 12 of the Convention obliges states to penalise 
                                                            
42They are Belarus, Canada, the Holy See, Japan, Mexico and USA. 
43 GRECO is seeking to encourage the States Parties to live up to their obligations under the Convention 
through a process of mutual evaluation and peer pressure. While a State Party automatically joins the GRECO 
when it ratifies the CoE Convention, a country may chose to participate in the GRECO without joining up to the 
Convention. 
44 Ligeti (2005: 324). 
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trading in influence,45 which it views as a specific form of corruption, linked to bribery. 
The provisions stipulated in the Convention are mandatory, but article 37 provides for 
the possibility of reservations with regard to some of the offences. Thus, any state 
can decide not to establish trading in influence as a criminal offence under its 
domestic law. By the end of August 2009, 10 Parties (among them France and 
Belgium) had declared that they would not criminalise the entire offence prescribed 
by article 12. The authors of the Explanatory Report emphasise that the offence of 
trading in influence would be a novelty for various States Parties. As the Convention 
aims to advance the range of anti-corruption criminal law measures, the 
criminalisation of trading in influence appeared indispensable.46  
(1) The elements of the offence under article 12 of the Council of Europe 
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption 
The criminalisation of trading in influence aims to prevent corrupt behaviour of 
persons who are ‘in the neighbourhood of power’47 and generate an ambience of 
corruption by seeking to profit from their positions. This so-called ‘background 
corruption’ attacks the same protected legal interests, namely, transparency and 
impartiality of public authorities, as do bribery and other corruption-related offences.48 
Article 12 presupposes a corrupt trilateral relationship where a person having real or 
pretended influence on persons referred to in articles 2, 4 to 6 and 9 to 11, uses his 
                                                            
45 Article 12 of the CoE Convention provides that:  
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal 
offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the promising, giving or offering, directly or 
indirectly, of any undue advantage to anyone who asserts or confirms that he or she is able to exert an 
improper influence over the decision‐making of any person referred to in articles 2, 4 to 6 and 9 to 11 in 
consideration thereof, whether the undue advantage is for himself or herself or for anyone else, as well as the 
request, receipt or the acceptance of the offer or the promise of such an advantage, in consideration of that 
influence, whether or not the influence is exerted or whether or not the supposed influence leads to the 
intended result. 
46 Explanatory Report on the CoE Convention, paragraph 63. 
47 Explanatory Report on the CoE Convention, paragraph 64. 
48 Explanatory Report on the CoE Convention, paragraph 64. 
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or her influence in exchange for an undue advantage from someone seeking this 
influence. It is noteworthy that the influence peddler cannot take decisions himself, 
but misuses his real or alleged influence on other persons. As the provision 
criminalises passive and active trading in influence, states may implement the 
offence in two separate parts. 
(a) Possible Offenders 
Under article 12 ‘anyone who asserts or confirms that he or she is able to exert an 
improper influence’ can be a possible offender. Unlike UNCAC, no special 
differentiation between public officials and private persons is made. 
However, the scope of the term ‘public official’ is quite wide under the CoE 
Convention, as its drafters desired to cover all possible categories of public officials in 
order to avoid loopholes. The exact definition of ‘public official’ is left to the states. 
But the national law should cover the persons mentioned in article 1(a) which defines 
the term for the purposes of the CoE Convention.  
(b) Undue advantage 
The scope of the term ‘advantage’ is comparable to its scope in UNCAC. The 
comments in the Explanatory Report on active and passive bribery also apply to 
article 12, in particular with regard to the benefits of corrupt activities. Accordingly, 
material and non-material values are covered. The offender or any other beneficiary 
must be placed in a better position than before the commission of the offence.49 The 
advantage can be given to a third party, for instance a relative, or an organisation to 
which the official belongs. Even though the term ‘entity’ is not mentioned in the 
                                                            
49 Explanatory Report on the CoE Convention, paragraph 37. 
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wording of article 12 (or article 2), the authors of the Explanatory Report are of the 
view that entities can be possible beneficiaries. According to them, the taker of the 
benefit must be a member of the organisation (for instance, a political party) which 
profits from the advantage. If he is not a formal member, he would therefore not act in 
contravention of the Convention provisions. If the advantage is destined for a person 
or entity other than the influence peddler himself, the latter must at least have 
knowledge thereof.  
The Explanatory Report states that the term ‘undue’ should be interpreted as 
‘something that the recipient is not lawfully entitled to accept or receive’.50 By using 
this term, advantages expressly permitted by law or internal rules (for instance, 
regarding socially accepted gifts) are excluded and thus not punishable. 
(c) Conduct 
The possible material components of the active form of trading in influence are the 
acts of promising, offering or giving an undue advantage, directly or indirectly, by the 
influence peddler. The three actions differ only slightly, and the elaborations in 
respect of UNCAC apply here as well.  
Regarding the passive form of trading in influence, the conduct required includes the 
request, receipt or the acceptance of an advantage in exchange for a misuse of 
one´s influence. 
 
                                                            
50 Explanatory Report on the CoE Convention, paragraph 38. 
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(d) ‘improper influence over the decision-making of any person referred to 
in articles 2, 4 to 6 and 9 to 11’ 
Article 12 of the CoE Convention presupposes the exertion of ‘improper’ influence, 
which means that a corrupt intent by the influence peddler is necessary.51 The term 
‘improper’ is supposed to differentiate legitimate from illegitimate influence and is 
therefore of considerable importance for the practical application of the offence.52 
The Explanatory Report clarifies that, for instance, acknowledged forms of lobbying 
should not be regarded as improper influence.53  
In the course of the trading in influence under article 12 of the CoE Convention, it is 
of no importance whether the influence was actually exerted, whether it leads to the 
intended result, or whether the ability to exert influence in fact existed.  
The offence presupposes that a person affirms to exert improper influence over the 
decision-making of any person referred to in articles 2, 4 to 6 and 9 to 11. These 
provisions identify domestic and foreign public officials (articles 2 and 5), members of 
domestic and foreign public assemblies (articles 4 and 6), officials of international 
organisations, members of international parliamentary assemblies or judges and 
officials of international courts (articles 9 to 11) as possible agents of the offence. 
Hence, the person who is to be influenced can be a national public official as well as 
a public official of a foreign country. Interestingly, even members of domestic and 
foreign public assemblies exercising legislative or administrative powers are possible 
targets of influence peddling. This is especially delicate, as members of parliament 
are in the position to enact rules and laws regarding their own status, and are 
                                                            
51 Explanatory Report on the CoE Convention, paragraph 65. 
52 See Androulakis (2007: 328). 
53 Explanatory Report on the CoE Convention, paragraph 65: ‘Improper’ influence must contain a corrupt intent 
by the influence peddler: acknowledged forms of lobbying do not fall under this notion.’ 
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generally not enthusiastic when it comes to the criminalisation of offences that are 
directly related to them. The extension to members of parliament takes into account 
that they are particularly attractive to corruptive outside influences because of their 
far-reaching powers. Furthermore, it takes into consideration that corruption is not 
only a reality in political circles but also a real danger to all democratic institutions of 
a country. By including foreign public officers and members of public assemblies, 
article 12 of the CoE Convention faces up to the reality that corruption is not limited to 
the territory of a state.  
(e)  Mens Rea 
The offence can only be committed intentionally under article 12, and the intent has 
to cover all other substantive elements of the offence. Intent must relate to a future 
result: the influence peddler using his influence as the client desires. 
3. African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption 
The African Union (AU), founded in July 2002, is the successor organisation to the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The AU covers the entire continent except for 
Morocco. The AU Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption was adopted 
by the heads of state at the African Union Summit held in Maputo on 11 July 2003. 
The Convention entered into force on 5 August 2006 and is open for signature by the 
53 Member States of the African Union. By July 2009, 43 states had signed the 
Convention, and 30 of them had ratified it. Among other provisions, the AU 
Convention demands of its members the criminalisation of various offences, such as 
bribery (domestic and foreign), diversion of property by public officials, trading in 
influence, illicit enrichment, money laundering and concealment of property. The AU 
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Convention does not limit its scope to the public sector, but also includes private 
sector corruption, both on the supply and on the demand side. 
(1) The criminalisation under article 4(1)(f) of the AU Convention 
The scope of application of the AU Convention is limited to the acts of corruption and 
related offences listed in article 4. Without expressly calling it ‘trading in influence’, 
article 4(1)(f)54 contains an offence which criminalises the promising, offering or giving 
of an undue advantage to anybody who asserts that he or she is able to influence 
decision-making in the public or private sector in exchange for that person abusing 
his or her real or supposed influence in order to gain an advantage for the instigator. 
Article 4(1)(f) is a mandatory provision, but article 24 allows states to make 
reservations as long as they are compatible with the object and the purpose of the 
Convention. The wording of this provision is identical to article 12 of the CoE 
Convention, except for one fundamental term: Article 4(1)(f) is not limited to the use 
of improper influence over the decision-making process within a public authority, but 
also extends to the private sector.  
As the other elements are the same as under article 12 of the CoE Convention, the 
elaborations made above apply here as well. The only aspect that requires further 
explanation is the inclusion of the private sector in the offence. 
 
                                                            
54 AU Convention, Article 4(1)(f) classifies as an act of corruption : 
 ‘the offering, giving, solicitation or acceptance directly or indirectly, or promising of any undue advantage to or 
by any person who asserts or confirms that he or she is able to exert any improper influence over the decision 
making of any person performing functions in the public or private sector in consideration thereof, whether the 
undue advantage is for himself or herself or for anyone else, as well as the request, receipt or the acceptance 
of the offer or the promise of such an advantage, in consideration of that influence, whether or not the 
influence is exerted or whether or not the supposed influence leads to the intended result.’ 
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(2) Trading in influence in the private sector 
Following article 4(1)(f), the manipulation of the decision-making process of any 
person performing functions in the private sector should be criminalised by the States 
Parties to the Convention. This obligation is a novelty in the armoury of both the 
international anti-corruption measures as well as the national legal regimes on this 
issue.  
The reason for the criminalisation of the interaction of two private persons under 
article 18 of UNCAC and article 12 of the CoE Convention is that their conduct aims 
to manipulate the decision-making process of a public authority. The protected legal 
interests are the transparency and impartiality in the functioning of the public 
administration. Corruption in the public sector in its various forms can constitute a 
threat to the rule of law and the stability of democratic institutions. Furthermore it 
jeopardises trust in the public administration. The offence of trading in influence 
focuses on a close circle of insiders in public institutions, with the objective of 
preventing them from manipulating public authorities, even if the public officer 
concerned is not part of the bribery process and remains in the background.  
The object of legal interest changes completely if the target of the influence peddling 
is a person performing functions in the private sector. Corruption in the private sector 
can distort competition and destabilise the affected market, which may have dire 
consequences for the entire economy. The fight against corruption in the private 
sector has long been a priority in the arena of international law, as can be seen from 
the various international initiatives on this issue.55 For instance, the Council 
                                                            
55 For instance: Joint Action 98/742/JHA, of 22 December 1998 on corruption in the private sector, adopted by 
the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union; see the respective articles in UNCAC 
and the CoE Convention. 
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Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on combating corruption in the 
private sector56 criminalises active and passive bribery in the private sector by taking 
into account the particularity of the circumstances in the private sector. Yet, until now 
no international anti-corruption treaty has stipulated the criminalisation of trading in 
influence in the private sector. The reason may be that many accepted parts of 
economic life could be the target of this extension and it would be enormously difficult 
to draw the line between a corrupt activity and a legal pursuit. For instance, in 
international as well as in national business relations, the use of middlemen is quite 
common and – to a certain degree – a legitimate form of commercial relationship.  
The AU Convention gives no satisfactory answers to the question of how to apply the 
offence of trading in influence with regard to the specific characteristics of an 
economic market. It is, in the end, an interesting issue which is worthy of further 
consideration.57 But it does not seem feasible merely to copy a provision (article 12 of 
the CoE Convention) which was modelled to protect the public administration and 
apply it to the private sector. It appears that the authors of article 4(1)(f) of the AU 
Convention did not take into consideration the consequences of the extension to the 
private sector while drafting the Convention. The approach to private-sector influence 
peddling in the AU Convention is unfortunately so nebulous and incomprehensive 
that a correction should be considered.  
4. Southern African Development Community Protocol against Corruption 
For the sake of completeness, the Southern African Development Community 
Protocol against Corruption (SADC Protocol) will be examined briefly. SADC began 
                                                            
56 Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on combating corruption in the private sector, 
Official Journal L 192 , 31/07/2003 P. 0054 – 0056.  
57 See Abanto Vasquez (2008: 928). 
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as a loose coalition of states, formed in Lusaka, Zambia, in 1980, and was 
transformed from a Coordinating Conference into a Development Community (SADC) 
in 1992 by Declaration and Treaty in Windhoek, Namibia, at a Summit of Heads of 
State.58  
The SADC Protocol was adopted at the Summit of the SADC Heads of State held in 
Blantyre, Malawi, in August 2001 and came into force on the 6 July 2005. By July 
2007, all States Parties of SADC (14 states) had signed the Protocol and nine had 
ratified it.59 It was the first regional anti-corruption treaty in Africa, adding an African 
perspective to the globalisation of the fight against corruption.60 
The Protocol aims to promote co-operation in the fight against corruption by States 
Parties and to harmonise national anti-corruption laws in the region. Each State Party 
is required to adopt the necessary legislative or other measures to establish as 
criminal offences under its domestic law the acts of corruption described in article 3.  
Under article 3(1)(f) of the SADC Protocol, the improper influencing of any person in 
the public or private sector relating to such person’s decision-making functions 
should be criminalised by the States Parties.61 Article 3(1)(f) is a binding provision 
since the Protocol does not provide for the possibility of making reservations. The 
wording of article 3(1)(f) is identical to article 4(1)(f) of the AU Convention, including 
                                                            
58 The member states are Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
59 Unfortunately, there are no updated data on the signature and ratification status available on the Internet.  
60 Matsheza (2001: 1). 
61 SADC Protocol, Article 3 classifies as acts of corruption: 
 ‘offering, giving, soliciting or accepting, directly or indirectly, or promising of any undue advantage to or by any 
person who asserts or confirms that he or she is able to exert any improper influence over the decision making 
of any person performing functions in the public or private sector in consideration thereof, whether the undue 
advantage is for himself or herself or for anyone else, as well as the request, receipt or the acceptance of the 
offer or the promise of such an advantage, in consideration of the influence, whether or not the influence is 
exerted or whether or not the supposed influence leads to the intended result.’ 
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the extension to the private sector. For that reason, I refer to the explanations made 
in that respect about the AU Convention. 
5. Summary 
The provisions examined are identical in that they all require the criminalisation of 
active and passive trading in influence. With respect to the influence peddler, the four 
provisions stipulate that this can be a private individual as well as a public officer. 
UNCAC contains the broadest definition of the term ‘public officer’. The term ‘undue 
advantage’ is similar under all the instruments. Only UNCAC and the CoE 
Convention give further information regarding an entity as the beneficiary of the 
advantage. The target of the influence peddling is a public authority under all 
provisions. The CoE Convention is especially wide in this regard, as it also 
criminalises the exertion of influence with respect to foreign public officials, public 
assemblies and members of international organisations. Interestingly, under the 
SADC Protocol and the AU Convention, the exertion of influence within the private 
sector should be criminalised.  
Under all four instruments it is irrelevant whether the influence was actually exerted, 
whether it leads to the intended result, or whether the ability to exert influence in fact 
existed. 
Article 18 of UNCAC and article 12 of the CoE Convention are non-binding 
provisions, whereas the conduct described in the AU Convention and the SADC 
Protocol is mandatory.  
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These provisions may serve as models for the implementation of the offence into the 
domestic law of the member states. The legislator of each state has to take into 
account the particularities of its criminal law in general and its anti-corruption 
measures in particular, to enact a law that is compatible with the standards 
established by the international instruments and the fundamental rules of its own 
criminal law. Thus, it would be interesting to see how states have implemented the 
offence into their respective domestic laws.  
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Chapter III Three Country Reviews 
1. The Legal Situation in France 
In France, comparable to the provisions of passive and active bribery, the Nouveau 
Code Penal (NCP) of 1994 stipulates offences of passive and active trading in 
influence (trafic d’influence).62 Two forms of trading in influence are to be 
differentiated: in the first case, the influence peddler holds a public office, in the 
second case both he and the client are private persons. Systematically, these two 
forms are separated stringently. Unlike the offence of bribery, the status of the person 
who uses his or her influence to trade advantages is of little consequence, although 
the status of the influence peddler has an impact on the severity of the punishment.  
Until 2007, the authorities upon which influence is illegally exerted (public authority or 
other body placed under the supervision of the public authorities) were understood as 
the French legislative, administrative and judicial authorities. By introducing articles 
435-2 and 435-4, the French legislator extended the scope of the offence of trading 
in influence to the offer or acceptance to influence a public official or a person holding 
an electoral mandate of an international organisation (EU, UN, NATO, etc).63 By this 
enlargement of the circle of persons upon which influence can be exerted illegally, 
the French legislator partly fulfilled its obligations under UNCAC and the CoE 
Convention. The French parliament decided not to extend the scope of the offence to 
public officials and elected persons of a foreign country because trading in influence 
                                                            
62 Passive trading in influence presumes that a person, taking advantage of real or assumed influence with the 
public authorities, solicits or accepts gifts or promises with a view to securing for the person providing the gifts, 
any benefit or favour of a public authority. Active trading in influence presupposes that a person offers a 
remuneration to someone whom he or she believes to have influence with the public authorities in order to 
obtain benefits or favours from those public authorities. See Larguier & Larguier (2002: 386). 
63 Law No. 2007‐1598, 13 November 2007.  
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is not punishable in most of the countries with which France has strong economic 
ties.64 
(1) Historical Background 
As far as we know, Roman law offered no definition of trading in influence. 
Nevertheless, this phenomenon was well known. Vitronius, a friend of the emperor 
Alexander Severus, is said to have accepted payment in exchange for exerting his 
influence on the emperor. When this was discovered he was sentenced to death by 
being choked with smoke.65 Someone noted the words ‘fumo punitur qui fumum 
vendidit’ on Vitronius’ tomb,66 expressing an understanding of his actions which we 
would share today: What is commercialised here is nothing tangible, but something 
rather more obscure – influence.67 
In Europe, the Napoleonic Code of 1810 may be regarded as a landmark by which 
tough penalties were introduced to combat corruption in public life, comprising both 
acts which did not conflict with one's official duties and acts which did.68 The 
introduction of the offence of trafic d’influence into the French penal code with the 
passing of the law of 4 July 1889, was a reaction to a loophole in the criminal law 
which had become apparent in the course of several scandals that shook the 
government at the end of the 19th century.69 
                                                            
64 Bulletin officiel du ministère de la justice, Circulaire de la DACG n° CRIM 08‐02/G3 du 9 janvier 2008 
présentant des dispositions de la loi n° 2007‐1598 du 13 novembre 2007 relative à la lutte contre la corruption, 
5. 
65 Lemec Gantsou Ossebi (2001: 10). 
66 Chevallier (1935:  39). 
67 Abanto Vasquez (2008: 913 & 914). 
68 Guy Stressens (2001: 891).  
69 Jeandididier (2003: 40). 
 
 
 
 
34 
The most important of these was a case in which the corrupt practices of several 
members of parliament were revealed, among them a certain Mr Wilson MP, who 
had been paid to influence public servants in their choice of recipients of medals of 
honour and orders of merit.70 MPs, as well as high-ranking members of the military, 
openly commercialised their contacts with important colleagues, friends and family 
members (for example Mr Wilson MP was the son-in-law of the then president, Jules 
Grevy).71 Mr Wilson was tried for fraud but found not guilty by the cour d’appel.72 
Here the loophole in the criminal law became evident: the elements of the crime of 
corruption only referred to civil servants or members of parliament accepting money 
in exchange for acts that were part of their official tasks and position anyway. 
However, peddling influence usually did not form part of the official functions of the 
perpetrator. The general influence that politicians or civil servants could exert on 
different levels of the public bureaucracy did not form part of the official functions of 
their office. In answer to this, the novel offence introduced into the penal code by the 
French parliament in 1889 fell under the category of corruption instead of fraud, as 
some MPs had suggested. 
(2) Trading in influence under the Nouveau Code Penal 
The main trading in influence offences are stipulated in article 432-11(1)(2) (passive 
trading in influence by public officials), article 433-2(1) (passive trading in influence 
by private persons), article 433-1(2) (active trading in influence by public officials) and 
433-2(2) (active trading in influence by private persons). The French offences served 
as a model for the provisions of the international conventions mentioned above.  
                                                            
70 Vitu, paragraph 44. 
71 Lemec Gantsou Ossebi (2001: 10). 
72 CA Paris, 26. March 1888, 1889, 87. 
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For instance, article 432-11 describes, in the second alternative, the offence of 
passive trading in influence committed by a public official.73 In terms of the possible 
offenders, the advantage received and the way of receiving it (requesting or 
accepting), bribery and trading in influence are identical.  
With regard to trading in influence, case law specifies that the potential benefits 
include ‘any favourable decision of the public authorities which, instead of being 
obtained by legitimate means, is obtained illegally by means of influence’.74 The 
elements of the offence are fulfilled as soon as the client and the influence peddler 
have concluded a corruptive contract (pacte corrupteur) about the exertion of 
influence.75 Under Art 433-11, it is not necessary that the action desired by the client 
actually takes place.76 It is not even necessary that there was ever a real possibility 
of influencing the public organ; provided this was alleged, the offence is committed.77 
The concept of influence is of great importance for the offence as it should enable 
those who apply the law to make a distinction between trading in influence and 
bribery. In the case of the offence of trading in influence, the influence peddler has to 
(mis)use his status to obtain a decision from a public organ in favour of the client. In 
contrast, for passive bribery it is required that the desired decision is part of the 
perpetrator’s area of responsibility or that it is facilitated through his office (quasi-
                                                            
73 Article 432‐11 
‘Persons exercising public authority, performing public duties or holding elective public office who unlawfully 
request or agree to, at any time, directly or indirectly, offers, promises, donations, gifts or any other 
advantages, for themselves or others, in exchange for: 
1. performing or refraining from performing actions in accordance with or facilitated by their duties, functions 
or office;  
2. or abusing their real or supposed influence to obtain from a public authority or department distinctions, 
employment, contracts or any form of favourable decision;  
shall be punishable by ten years' imprisonment and a fine of € 150 000.’ 
74 Cass Crim 20 March 1997. Bull crim 1997 no. 117. 
75 Veron (2007: 72). 
76 Gattegno (2003: 350). 
77 Veron (2007: 73). 
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bribery). Thus, in the case of trading in influence, the public official who is 
commercialising his influence is not acting in the context of his office, but from the 
outside. He merely uses his professional position or social status to influence the 
decision of another public official, which decision he himself cannot take.  
In an individual case, it appears quite difficult to make the distinction between passive 
bribery and passive trading in influence. French scholars are of the view that, with 
regard to trading in influence, the civil servant peddling his influence is acting beyond 
his functions and duties by taking advantage of his position or friendly working 
relationships with colleagues. Regarding passive bribery, he is commercialising his 
function within his area of responsibility.78 As Vitu puts it, ‘the guilty party does not 
peddle his or her office, but his or her status’.79 In practice, this differentiation is not 
always clear and even the Cour de Cassation seems to have problems making a 
precise differentiation, as is evident from some of its decisions.80 
There is no abstract academic discussion in France about what exactly is to be 
protected through the criminalisation of corruption offences. Conclusions could be 
drawn from the systematic positioning of the offences under the heading ‘violation of 
the authority of the state’ and ‘felonies and misdemeanours against the nation, the 
state and the public peace’. Thus, the objects of legal protection are the functioning 
and the integrity of the public service. As described above, for a contravention of 
article 433-11 to occur, it is not necessary that the actual ability to influence the 
decision of a public authority in fact existed. It suffices that the influence peddler 
pretended to have this influence. Thus, it is questionable how the functioning and the 
integrity of the public service could be affected if there was in fact never even the 
                                                            
78 Jeandidier (2003: 40). 
79 Vitu A, paragraph  124, « Le coupable trafique, non de sa fonction, mais de sa qualité » 
80 Examples can be found in Lemec Gantsou Ossebi (2001: 18 & 334).  
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possibility of manipulating the decision of a person holding public office. In the case 
of an influence peddler fabricating his ability to influence the decision-making process 
of another public authority, it appears that his action is more punishable as a fraud or 
a similar offence, than as a corruption offence.  
2. The Legal Situation in Spain 
The Spanish Criminal Code provides three different versions of trading in influence in 
articles 428 to 430 of the sixth chapter of the ninth title under the heading ‘del tráfico 
de influencias’.81 Today, articles 428 to 430 complement the offences of active and 
passive bribery but differ from them in one important aspect: they refer only to 
passive trading in influence; the active form is not criminalised as an autonomous 
offence under the Spanish Criminal Code. 
Passive trading in influence is subdivided into two main categories: articles 42882 and 
42983 refer to the exertion of improper influence by an influence peddler who is a 
                                                            
81 The offences of trading in influence were first introduced into the Spanish Criminal Code in 1928, but were 
altered  in 1944 when  the criminalisation of exerted  improper  influence disappeared and only peddling with 
fabricated influence was punishable as a serious form of fraud. It was only in 1991 that the complete offences 
were reintroduced. They have since been modified with regard to the benefit obtained by a public official, as 
well as to the severity of the penalty. 
82 Article 428: 
Exertion of improper influence by an authority/public official 
The  authority  or  public  official  that  influences  another  authority  or  public  official,  by  taking  advantage  of 
his/her post or of any other hierarchical or personal relationship with this person or with any other authority or 
public official  so  as  to obtain  a decision which may directly or  indirectly  generate  an  economic benefit  for 
himself/herself or for a third party, will be punished with a prison sentence of six months to one year, a fine of 
up to double the value of the said benefit, and specific disqualification from any public employment or post for 
a period of  three  to  six years. When  the benefit  sought  is  in  fact obtained,  the  sanctions applied will  range 
within the upper half of the scale. 
83 Article 429 
Exertion of improper influence by private individuals 
The individual that influences an authority or a public official taking advantage of his/her personal relationship 
with this person, or with any other authority or public official, so as to obtain a decision which may directly or 
indirectly generate an economic benefit for himself/herself or for a third party, will be punished with a prison 
sentence  of  six  months  to  one  year,  a  fine  of  up  to  double  the  value  of  the  said  benefit,  and  specific 
disqualification from any public employment or post for a period of three to six years. When the benefit sought 
is in fact obtained, the sanctions applied will range within the upper half of the scale. 
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public official and a by private individual respectively. Article 430 deals with the 
situation where a benefit is requested or accepted by a public official or a private 
person in order to exert his or her influence.  
(1) Trading in influence under article 428 and 429 of the Spanish Criminal 
Code 
Both articles require that influence is in fact exerted on the public official to obtain a 
decision from a public authority that creates an economic benefit in favour of the 
actor or a third person.84 The question of fabricated influence is not covered by these 
articles.85 Article 428 and 429 require that the person peddling his influence takes 
advantage of his or her personal or hierarchical relationship with the public official 
(‘prevalimiento’, a form of a predominant position) in order to exert an improper 
influence over the decision-making of the latter. The decision that generates an 
economic benefit for the influence peddler or the client is the intended goal. The 
provisions fail to qualify the benefit as undue or unlawful. Thus ‘any economic 
benefit’, whether due or undue, is covered by the offence if it is the result of having 
influenced the decision-making process of a public official. The offence does not 
require that the desired decision is in fact achieved; it is sufficient that the exerted 
influence was intended and appropriate to generate the benefit.86 If the benefit is in 
fact obtained, both articles 428 and 429 stipulate that this may have an aggravating 
impact on the severity of the punishment. 
In comparison to the offences that have been analysed hitherto, articles 428 and 429 
appear to be quite different. As described above, the common elements of trading in 
                                                            
84 Abanto Vasquez (2003: 461). 
85 Abanto Vasquez (2008: 915). 
86 Morales Prats & Rodriguez Puerta (2005: 2151). 
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influence offences, stipulated in the laws of other countries or in international 
agreements, are characterised by the enlargement of the triangular relationship 
characteristic of corruption offences by a fourth person and the commercialisation of 
influence. The Spanish provisions lack both of these elements: they deal exclusively 
with the situation where a public official or a private individual directly influences a 
public authority, making use of the fact that they are in a predominant position to do 
so. They do not need to receive a benefit from a third party, but act in order to receive 
a favourable decision for themselves (yet this may include advantages for third 
persons). The public official or the private individual misuses his or her office or 
personal relationship (friendship, relatives, etc) to other officials without 
commercialising it as in the ‘classic forms’ of trading in influence. Thus, this offence 
appears more like a form of perversion of justice and is not properly comparable to 
the other offences. In this regard, the heading ‘trading in influence’ is somewhat 
misleading.87 
(2) Trading in influence under article 430 of the Spanish Criminal Code 
Article 430 stipulates a genuine form of trading in influence as it requires the request 
for or acceptance of gifts or any other type of remuneration in order to exert an 
improper influence.88 
                                                            
87 Morales Prats & Rodriguez Puerta (2005: 2146). 
88 Article 430: 
Request or acceptance of a benefit in order to exert improper influence 
Those that offer to carry out the actions described in the previous articles, requesting sops, gifts or any other 
remuneration, from third parties, or accept offers or promises, will be punished with a prison sentence 
between six months and one year.  
In any of the cases that this article refers to, the judicial authority may also impose the suspension of activities 
of the company, organisation or office and the closure of its public facilities for a period between six months 
and three years. 
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As the article refers to articles 428 and 429, both forms – the influence peddling by a 
private person as well as by a public official – are punishable under the Spanish 
Criminal Code. The reference to the previous articles emphasises that not every form 
of influence peddling is punishable. The intentional use of hierarchical or personal 
relationships with the public authority is required. The influence peddling has to lead 
to an economically favourable decision for the client.  
It should be emphasised again that only passive influence trading is punishable 
under the Spanish Criminal Code; the conduct of the person offering the advantage 
for the influence peddling is not expressly punishable (except in cases where an 
instigation can be considered).89  
The influence peddler has to obtain an advantage from the person who wants him to 
exert his influence in his favour. Unlike articles 428 and 429, article 430 does not 
refer to the term ‘economic benefit’. In a recent case, where the influence peddler 
obtained a working contract for his wife, the Supreme Court had to decide whether 
this could be considered as ‘sops, gifts or any other remuneration’. The Court stated 
that the wording ‘any other remuneration’ permits a wide interpretation which covers 
any benefit of whatever form and goes beyond the economic nature of the benefit 
received.90 
                                                            
89 Nogales (2006: 384). 
90 Case 335/2006 of 24 March 2006, p 4: ‘Observamos que dentro de estos términos no se menciona el aspecto 
económico, aunque usualmente será esa contraprestación la que actúe, pero la amplitud de la frase ‘cualquier 
otra remuneración’ permite interpretar los términos del precepto de tal suerte que en el concepto puede 
comprenderse cualquier recompensa o beneficio del tipo que sea.’ 
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Furthermore, in its judgment, the Court spells out that it is not necessary under article 
430 that the influence is actually exerted or that it leads to the intended result.91 It is 
not even necessary that the possibility of influencing a public authority in fact existed. 
The assertion of the trader in influence that he could exercise such influence is 
sufficient for the contravention.92 Earlier decisions of the Supreme Court had required 
that the influence indeed existed and could effectively enable the influence peddler to 
manipulate the decision of a public authority;93 if not, the person was to be 
prosecuted for fraud. By contrast, in the above-mentioned judgment, the court stated 
that the Spanish legislator showed ‘an atypical severity by criminalising a preparatory 
act which is remote from the object of legal protection: the objectivity and impartiality 
of public decisions which is the primordial prerequisite for a correct functioning of the 
public service’.94  
Thus, the Supreme Court accepts the hypothesis that even alleged influence 
peddling could be considered a threat to the impartiality of the public service. In 
contradistinction, Spanish academia is of the view that the objectivity and the 
impartiality of the public administration can be threatened neither by persons who in 
fact have no influence, nor if the influence is not actually exerted.95 Some authors 
emphasise that article 430 punishes only preparatory acts in order to protect the 
good reputation of the public administration, which cannot be considered a valid 
                                                            
91 Case 335/2006 of 24 March 2006, p 4: ’Por lo demás, no es necesario para la consumación del delito que el 
acusado realmente tenga posibilidades de influir, o sea simplemente una falacia, como tampoco que aun 
teniendo tal posibilidad, se haya hecho o no la gestión y ésta haya sido exitosa o anodina.’ 
92Case 335/2006 of 24 March 2006, p 4. 
93 For example, case 8900/1992 of 4 December 1992. 
94 Case 335/2006 of 24 March 2006, p 4: ‘El delito es de simple actividad, y en él, el legislador ha mostrado un 
rigor inusitado al criminalizar un acto preparatorio, todavía alejado de lo que sería el bien jurídico protegido: la 
objetividad e imparcialidad de las decisiones administrativas, exigencia primordial para un correcto 
funcionamiento de las Administraciones públicas.’ 
95 Munoz Conde (2007: 1031). 
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object of legal interest.96 Others maintain that the reference in article 430 to the 
previous articles implies that the possibility of influencing a public authority must exist 
in fact, so that there is at least a threat to the objectivity and impartiality of the public 
sector.97 
The prevailing opinion in academia supports the retention of the trading in influence 
offences as they play an important role in the reasoning of the Courts in respect of 
several political scandals.98 Numerous court decisions have dealt with the provisions 
on trading in influence, as illustrated above.99  
3. The Legal Situation in Belgium 
The Belgian anti-corruption provisions were altered fundamentally and modernised 
by the Law of 10 February 1999,100 which aimed to meet Belgium’s international 
commitments arising from the CoE Convention. 
Among other modifications, a new article 247(4) was introduced which  criminalises 
bribing a public official into using the influence that arises from his position in order to 
obtain certain behaviour from a public authority.101 Article 247(4) criminalises both the 
active and the passive forms of trading in influence. 
                                                            
96 For that reason, Morales Prats & Rodriguez Puerta (2005: 2154) require the deletion of article 430. 
97 See Abanto Vasquez (2008: 918). 
98 Abanto Vasquez (2008: 919). 
99 According to the annual reports of the Attorney‐General’s Office, preliminary investigations were carried out 
in connection with 24 cases concerning trading in influence in 2006 (a 100 percent increase as compared to 
2005); in 2007, 82 preliminary investigations had been initiated for trading in influence offences. (See: Greco 
Evaluation Spain (2008: 17).  
100  Law on  the Fight against Corruption of 10 February 1999, published  in  the Belgian official gazette on 23 
March 1999, 9281. 
101 Article 247(4): 
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The Belgian legislator has incorporated trading in influence as a new kind of 
corruption offence by introducing paragraph 4 into article 247. Apart from bribery that 
involves lawful (paragraph 1) or unlawful (paragraph 2) acts by a public official, 
paragraph 4 criminalises trading in influence, using the same legal approach and 
basically sharing the same elements as active and passive bribery. The scope of the 
term ‘public official’ is rather wide, as it refers to any person performing public duties, 
regardless of his official status. The new articles 246 and 247 do not require an 
underlying ‘corruptive pact or agreement’, as was traditionally demanded under the 
Belgian Criminal Code.102 The benefit, requested or accepted by the official, can be 
any advantage.103 This includes both material and non-material benefits with a link to 
the desired action of the public official. The advantage may also benefit a third 
person, as personal enrichment is not a requirement of the offence. 
Probably due to the relative newness of the legislation, neither the academy in 
Belgium nor the case law has yet clarified what the term ‘arising from their position’ 
encompasses. It remains unclear what kind of link in fact is required between the 
ability to exert influence and the position of the public official.  
Furthermore, it is questionable whether article 247(4) covers cases where influence 
is asserted but not exerted, or where the supposed influence does not lead to the 
intended result. If the public official actually ‘used the influence arising from his 
duties’, article 247(4)(3) emphasises that this may have an aggravating impact on the 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
§ 4. Bribing a person exercising public duties to use his real or supposed influence arising from his position to 
obtain an action or decision from a public authority or ensure that no such decision is made is punishable by six 
months' to one year's imprisonment and a fine of 100 to 10 000 francs. 
When, in the case specified in the previous paragraph, the request as specified in article 246§1 is followed by 
an offer as specified in article 246§2, and in cases where an offer as specified in article 246§2 is accepted, the 
penalty shall be six months' to two years' imprisonment and a fine of 100 to 25 000 francs.  
If the person who is bribed has actually used his influence arising from his duties he shall be punished by six 
months' to three years' imprisonment and a fine of 100 to 50 000 francs. 
102 Flore (1999: 94). 
103 See article 246. 
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extent of the sanctions. Concerning the question of whether there is a contravention 
if the intended result is not achieved, the article is silent.  
Although the Belgian legislator was inspired by the French anti-corruption legislation 
while drafting the offence of trading in influence,104 the Belgian policy-maker decided 
not to criminalise trading in influence among private individuals, as was done in 
France. Article 247(4) does not cover situations in which a private individual receives 
an advantage from another private individual in exchange for exercising influence 
over someone performing public duties. This omission was highly controversial and 
was criticised by many Belgian scholars.105  
In response, the Belgian Senate passed a draft bill on 14 January 2008 aiming to 
include the criminalisation of private trading in influence into the Criminal Code106 and 
sent it to the House of Representatives in February 2008. The drafted article 317107 
aims to comply with Belgium’s commitments under the CoE Convention and UNCAC. 
The explanatory remarks of the draft refer expressly to article 12 of the CoE 
Convention. The House of Representatives is afraid to interfere with legitimate types 
of lobbying and has not yet adopted the legislation. 
                                                            
104 Flore (1999: 92). 
105 Evrard (1999: 95). 
106 Parliament of Belgium (Sénat de Belgique), Document législatif n° 4‐507/1. 
107 The new article 317 would read as follows:  
§ 1. The action of a person not performing public duties within  the meaning of article 246 who  requests or 
accepts, directly or  through  the  intermediation of other persons,  for himself or others, offers, promises or 
advantages of any nature in exchange for using his real or supposed influence to obtain a decision from a public 
authority or ensure that no such decision is made constitutes passive trading in influence. 
§ 2. The action of a person who provides or offers, directly or through the intermediation of other persons, to a 
person  not  performing  public  duties within  the meaning  of  article  246,  for  himself  or  others,  promises  or 
advantages of any nature in exchange for using his real or supposed influence to obtain a decision from a public 
authority or ensure that no such decision is made constitutes active trading in influence. 
§ 3. The penalty for trading in influence shall be six months' to two years' imprisonment and/or a fine of 100 to 
10 000 francs. 
§  4.  When  trading  in  influence  concerns  a  public  department  or  authority  in  a  foreign  state  or  in  an 
organisation governed by public international law, the penalties shall be those stipulated by § 3. 
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4. Summary 
The comparison reveals different levels of criminalisation in the countries reviewed: 
whereas the French offences of trading in influence are quite extensive and complex 
– including passive and active trading in influence of public officials as well as of 
private individuals –, the Spanish provisions penalise only the passive type of 
influence trading.108 The Belgian norms are limited to the criminalisation of public 
officials who commercialise their influence and therefore do not cover cases of 
‘anyone’ within the meaning of article 12 of the CoE Convention. Furthermore, the 
Belgian provision does not stipulate precisely whether or not the influence actually 
has to be exerted in order to constitute an offence. In this respect, the French and 
Spanish provisions are somewhat unambiguous, as it is not necessary under these 
provisions that the influence is actually exerted or leads to the intended result.   
All three countries do not meet their obligations arising from the CoE Convention to 
penalise influence peddling with respect to foreign public officials or members of a 
foreign public assembly.  
The French example exposes the difficulties of drawing an exact line between the 
offences of bribery and trading in influence. In this context, the offence of trading in 
influence seems to serve as a ‘residual’ yet useful offence.109 
The academic or jurisprudential debate about the object of legal protection of trading 
in influence is being fought in all three countries. As the pretence of the ability to 
                                                            
108 It would be possible to punish any private individual according to the general rules on participation. In this 
respect, it is noteworthy that the Spanish prosecution service could not demonstrate any cases of active 
trading in influence during the third GRECO evaluation round in 2008. 
109 See, for instance, on the 27 October 2009 Jean‐Christophe Mitterrand and ex‐Interior Minister Charles 
Pasqua were convicted by a Paris Court for trading in influence after having accepted bribes to facilitate arms 
deals to Angola from 1993 to 1998. (BBC News, available on the internet: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8328314.stm ) 
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exert influence on a public authority is sufficient to fulfil the elements, it is highly 
controversial whether the legal object, namely, the objectivity and impartiality of 
public decisions, could be affected by this conduct. Be that as it may, the respective 
countries have decided to retain or implement the offence in their criminal codes.  
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Chapter IV Trading in influence and Lobbyism  
The offence of trading in influence does not aim to criminalise every exertion of 
influence with a public authority but only the illegitimate, improper exertion or the 
abuse of influence in order to induce a public authority to act or refrain from acting. In 
a particular case, it might be difficult to draw the line between legitimate and 
illegitimate forms of influencing, as various occupational areas are in part or 
completely dedicated to exert some sort of influence with the objective of 
manipulating public authorities. At the international level, the drafters of the CoE 
Convention were aware of the hypothetical interference of article 12 with legitimate 
forms of influence. With respect to article 12 of the CoE Convention, the Explanatory 
Report states that ‘recognised forms of lobbyism should not be criminalized’.110 
Lobbying is understood as the practice of influencing decisions made by government 
and includes all attempts to influence legislators and officials, whether in groups or 
individually.111 During the process of drafting UNCAC, several states expressed their 
desire not to penalise trading in influence and indicated that ‘if there was consensus 
for inclusion, care should be taken to avoid inadvertent interference with legitimate 
political activity’.112  
Also, at the national level, states expressed their difficulties on how to exclude 
legitimate influence from the offence. For instance, while drafting a new offence 
aimed at trading in influence between private individuals, the Belgian legislator 
stressed that the misuse or abuse of influence presupposes the intention to corrupt 
                                                            
110 Explanatory Report on the CoE Convention, paragraph 65. 
111 Leif & Speth (2006: 12). 
112 Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a Convention against Corruption, Doc. A/AC.261/3/Rev.1, 29, 
footnote 162. 
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somebody.113 Through this prerequisite, it is sought to exclude legitimate and 
transparent services offered by consultants, lobbyists, lawyers, etc from the scope of 
the offence of trading in influence.114 The proposed draft was not accepted by the 
Law Commission of the Belgian Parliament, as the offence, as drafted, would 
constitute a threat to all consultative occupations because of its indeterminacy and its 
wide scope.115 The Swiss legislator declined finally to incorporate the offence into the 
Swiss penal code as it would have resulted in the criminalisation of simple lobbying 
as it is practised all over the world, including Switzerland.116 Similar fears were raised 
by the British legislator while drafting a new Corruption Bill in 2003.117 
The possible interference of the offence of trading in influence with consultative 
professions indeed cannot be dismissed. Precise and well-defined elements of the 
offence can counter this difficulty by taking into account the desired level of legitimate 
exercise of influence with respect to the public administration in the particular state. 
For instance, lobbyists are generally trying to influence legislation on behalf of a 
special interest group or a member of a lobby. Because they are financed by a 
special interest group in order to influence a public authority, the application of the 
offence of trading in influence seems to be self-evident.  
However, in many countries the practice of lobbying is considered essential to the 
proper functioning of government and provides a forum for different and competing 
                                                            
113 Parliament of Belgium (Sénat de Belgique), Report made on behalf of the Committee on legal affairs by M. 
van Parys, Document legislative n° 4‐507/3.  
114 Parliament of Belgium (Sénat de Belgique), Document législatif n° 4‐507/1 : Comment on article 2: 
«…L'influence « abusive » doit contenir une intention de corrompre de la part du trafiquant d'influence: les 
formes de lobbying connues ne relèvent pas de cette notion ». Sont ainsi exclus du champ de l'incrimination les 
services rémunérés prestés dans la transparence par des personnes spécialisées dans les relations avec les 
administrations publiques comme les avocats, conseils ou lobbyistes. » 
115 M. Coveliers during the debate of the Committee on legal affairs, see footnote 112. 
116 Draft Corruption Bill of the Federal Council of Switzerland (Botschaft über die Genehmigung und die 
Umsetzung des Strafrechts‐Übereinkommens und des Zusatzprotokolls des Europarates über Korruption), 
Document 04.072, 34. 
117 House of Lords/House of Commons (2003: paragraph 79). 
 
 
 
 
49 
points of view. For instance, in many European countries118 and especially in the 
United States, lobbying is recognised as a desirable and necessary form of 
participation in the legislative process, as it can provide the responsible public 
authorities with information, data and assessments in complex fields of legislation. 
Often, the legislator is in dire need of information and know-how regarding areas of 
legislation of especially high complexity and comprehensiveness.119 Lobbyists 
regularly provide partial and not neutral information, but the public authority or the 
legislative authority presumably knows about the provenance of the data and their 
one-sidedness. However, lobbyists take part in the political decision-making process 
without possessing a democratic mandate; they are a power without any democratic 
legitimacy.120 It is, therefore, of public interest to know which interest group is 
participating to what extent in the law-making process. To prevent the erosion of 
democratic institutions and the administration, lobbying activities must be regulated, 
generally through registers in each state121 and additionally should be governed by a 
code of ethics.122 This is a necessary prerequisite for effective and transparent 
communication between parliamentarians and public officials, on the one hand, and 
the country’s stakeholders, on the other.123  
Even if this does not concern the area of criminal law, the regulations or codes of 
conduct can serve as a helpful indication for the determination of improper or proper 
                                                            
118 Lobbying is not limited to the decision‐making process in European countries but also affects the European 
institutions. For instance, there are currently around 15 000 lobbyists in Brussels (consultants, lawyers, 
associations, corporations, NGOs, etc.) seeking to influence the EU’s legislative process. About 2 600 interest 
groups have a permanent office in Brussels. See Lehman (2003: 5). 
119 House of Commons (2008–09: 9): ‘The practice of lobbying in order to influence political decisions is a 
legitimate and necessary part of the democratic process. Individuals and organisations reasonably want to 
influence decisions that may affect them, those around them, and their environment. Government in turn 
needs access to the knowledge and views that lobbying can bring.’,  
120 Leif & Speth (2006: 13).  
121 For an overview see Lehman (2003: 43). 
122 For further information see Chari, Murphy & Hogan (2007: 433). 
123 Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development (2006:1 & 3). 
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influence with respect to criminal offences. As the accepted level of lobbyism varies 
from country to country, it appears preferable that each state decides individually 
which forms of influence trading should constitute an offence and which are deemed 
socially necessary.  
Furthermore, corruption offences are generally clandestine in nature. A high degree 
of transparency in lobbying activities, could cause the secret use of influence to lose 
ground. Moreover, the persons involved are required to act with the intent to corrupt 
the public authority. In cases of legitimate and apparent lobbying, this condition 
usually would not be fulfilled.  
However, when considering the implementation of an offence of trading in influence, 
states should not overestimate the impact of criminalisation on legitimate forms of 
lobbyism. In my estimation, France, for example, has always known various forms of 
legitimate lobbyism in its political and administrative system, which forms were not in 
the least negatively affected by the offence of trading in influence.  
All arguments considered, the commercialisation of illegal forms of influence trading 
should be made an offence, the elements of which, however, need to be defined in a 
precise and unambiguous manner by legislation.  
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Chapter V Conclusion and Recommendations 
1. Conclusion 
Trading in influence is a corruption-related offence whose implementation is 
suggested by various international anti-corruption agreements and which is 
criminalised in numerous countries around the globe. Interestingly, it appears that it is 
mostly countries whose juridical background is rooted in the Romanic traditions that 
have the offence124 whereas countries within the Anglo-American legal tradition are 
not familiar with the concept.  
The offence of trading in influence stipulated in the international agreements is linked 
to the traditional offence of bribery, but differs in respect of two important issues from 
the classic bribery offences: Firstly, in contrast to bribery, trading in influence requires 
a multilateral relationship in which a public authority is induced to act or refrain from 
acting. The public official who performs the act is not part of the bribery process, 
which shows the indirect purpose and implicit character of the offence. Secondly, 
while bribery focuses on the act or omission by the public official, trading in influence 
seeks to criminalise the use of a person’s influence to obtain an undue advantage for 
a third person from a public official. With respect to public officials acting as influence 
peddlers, the offence of trading in influence goes beyond the instances covered by 
the offence of bribery.  
Under the most comprehensive and only truly international instrument, UNCAC, as 
well as the CoE Convention, the implementation of the offence is not mandatory, but 
                                                            
124 Especially countries following the Ibero‐American legal tradition like for instance Argentina, Peru and 
Colombia have implemented the offence of trading in influence. 
 
 
 
 
52 
left to the discretion of the states. The consensus for a non-binding implementation in 
the international arena reflects the justified doubts of many states about the offence. 
However, the provisions stipulated in the international agreements reviewed above 
can provide only a vague concept of what should be criminalised in the respective 
countries. The analysis of the provisions in France, Spain and Belgium reveals the 
very different methods of implementation: In France, trading in influence is 
criminalised most comprehensively with the NCP, penalising the active and passive 
forms of both public officials and private individuals acting as influence peddlers. 
Under the Spanish Penal Code, only the passive form of influence peddling is 
punishable as a main offence, while the Belgian criminal law refers only to public 
officials acting as influence peddlers. 
The analysis also reveals the three main difficulties which arise in the drafting of a 
clear and precise offence of trading in influence: 
Firstly, states have to face the difficulty of how to differentiate precisely between the 
offence of bribery and the offence of trading in influence. This is especially difficult in 
cases where the influence peddler is a public official. For this distinction, the 
definitions of the individual elements of the offence of bribery are fundamental, which 
elements differ distinctly among countries. More precisely, it depends on the scope of 
what may be defined as ‘the exercise of the public official’s duties’ within the offence 
of bribery. The question is whether actions of the public official which do not concern 
his area of responsibility or his official duties, but are facilitated by his status, are 
covered by the bribery offence. For instance, if a public official receives an advantage 
to manipulate the decision-making of another public official who is subordinated 
hierarchically to the first one, this could constitute the offence of bribery in some 
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countries, whereas in others it does not. The French example reveals quite 
illustratively how challenging the question of differentiation can be in practice.  
Secondly, the criminalisation of influence peddling among private persons causes the 
problem of how to exclude legitimate forms of lobbying from the offence. As 
examined in Chapter IV, there is no general answer to tackling this problem, but 
states have to take into account the legitimate role that public or private interest 
groups play in their society, especially with regard to the legislative process. 
Thirdly, the inclusion of pretended or supposed influence in the content of the 
provision (as stipulated, for example, by the CoE Convention or in the French 
provisions) leads to the question of which legitimate legal purpose is in fact being 
served by the offence. Trading in influence – like other corruption offences in the 
public sector – is aimed at protecting the impartiality and transparency of the 
functioning of public authorities. This protected legal interest can be affected even if it 
is only private persons trying to manipulate the decision-making of a public officer. 
But if the ability to influence a public authority in reality never existed, there could not 
be a threat to the object of legal protection. The assertion of fictive influence 
constitutes an offence of fraud – rather than of corruption – as the only legal interest 
which could be negatively affected is the private property of the person giving the 
bribe. As criminal law is an ultima ratio measure and must meet the basic principles 
of law – for example, the principle of proportionality – every criminal offence has to 
pursue a legitimate goal in the form of a protected legal interest. The criminalisation 
of pretended influence as a form of corruption, therefore, does not appear 
proportional, as it could not serve the purpose of protecting the legal interest of the 
functioning of public authorities. Even if the influence peddler decided from the outset 
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not to exert it, threat to the protected legal interest may be identifiable at least, if the 
ability to influence actually existed. 
2. Recommendations 
States ought to act with caution when implementing the offence of trading in 
influence, taking into account their domestic anti-corruption law and especially their 
definition of the offence of bribery. In some states, influence peddling may, at least as 
far as the official’s side is concerned, already be punishable as passive bribery.  
States have to consider limiting the scope of the offence of influence trading that 
depends on the official’s position. Furthermore, they should consider defining 
influence trading as a result offence rather than as a conduct offence. At least, they 
should ensure that – in contrast to the recommendations stipulated by the 
international agreements – the pretence of influence is not be punishable as a 
corruption offence.  
Once a state has dealt successfully with these questions, the implementation is 
without doubt recommendable, especially to fight against a certain type of ‘backroom’ 
corruption, which is certainly present in every country. The criminalisation of those 
who are in the ‘corridors’ of power, even if they do not take the decisions themselves, 
is indeed of great importance as their conduct is as corrosive to public trust in 
democracy and in public administration as the classic forms of corruption.  
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